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Abstract
User authentication is an important step to protect information and in this field
face biometrics is advantageous. Face biometrics is natural, easy to use and less
human-invasive. Unfortunately, recent work has revealed that face biometrics is
vulnerable to spoofing attacks using low-tech equipments. The goal of this masters
dissertation is two fold. Firstly, we introduce a novel and appealing approach to
detect face spoofing using the spatiotemporal (dynamic texture) extensions of the
highly popular local binary pattern operator. Evaluated with the only two pub-
licly current available databases (Replay Attack Database and CASIA Face Anti-
Spoofing Database), the final performance results show that our approach performs
better than state of the art countermeasures (following their provided evaluation
protocols). Secondly, we provide a comparative study of countermeasures covering
different databases and focusing in the biases that these databases can introduce.
Evaluated with state of the art countermeasures, the results show that the counter-
measures are very sensitive to databases biases.
Key-words: Antispoofing, Liveness detection, Countermeasures, Face Recognition,
Biometrics
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Resumo
Autenticac¸a˜o de usua´rios e´ uma importante tarefa para proteger informac¸o˜es e, nesta a´rea
de conhecimento, a biometria facial apresenta algumas vantagens. A biometria facial e´ natural,
de usabilidade fa´cil e menos invasiva. Infelizmente, trabalhos recentes revelaram que sistemas
de autenticac¸a˜o facial sa˜o vulnera´veis a ataques de spoofing utilizando equipamentos baratos e
de baixa tecnologia. Esta dissertac¸a˜o de mestrado possui dois objetivos principais. Primeira-
mente, apresentamos uma abordagem inovadora para detectar ataques de spoofing em sistemas
de autenticac¸a˜o facial utilizando texturas dinaˆmicas atrave´s de uma extensa˜o do descritor de
textura Local Binary Patterns. Experimentos realizados com as duas u´nicas bases de dados
de v´ıdeo atualmente dispon´ıveis publicamente (Replay Attack Database e CASIA Face Anti-
Spoofing Database), mostraram um desempenho superior a`s contramedidas do estado da arte
desta a´rea de pesquisa. Como segundo objetivo, fornecemos um estudo comparativo de con-
tramedidas cobrindo diferentes bases de dados, focando nos poss´ıveis vie´ses que estas bases
de dados podem introduzir. Experimentos realizados com contramedidas do estado da arte,
mostraram que as bases de dados introduzem um forte vie´s nas contramedidas.
Palavras-chave: Antispoofing, Detecc¸a˜o de Vitalidade, Contramedidas, Reconheci-
mento Facial, Biometria
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Chapter1
Introduction
In our modern society, the authentication procedure is an important task to protect data
and resources (physical or digital). Consisting of the confirmation of a claimed identity, the
authentication step is the first and most critical task of security procedure, restricting access to
unauthorized users.
Biometrics is the science of recognizing the identity of a person based on their physical
attributes and / or behavior, such as face, fingerprints, hand veins, voice or iris (Li and Jain;
2011). The use of biometrics in an authentication procedure has some advantages. Naturally,
is not possible to forget or transfer a biometric trait and it hardly disappears (perhaps only in
case of a serious accident). However, biometrics has some drawbacks. Compared with regular
authentication systems, such as passwords or tokens, which are precise, biometric authentication
systems have probabilistic behavior. It turns out that biometrics hardly has perfect match;
therefore, authentication systems have to deal with error rates. These errors rates can vary
depending on a number of factors. As an example, our voice can vary drastically when we get
sick or when we are under stress and this impacts a speaker authentication system. Aging,
illumination, pose and face expressions are classical issues in face authentication systems.
The use of biometrics in our daily lives has grown in the last decade and we can quote several
examples of this. The confirmation of an identity in the brazilian electoral process is based on
fingerprints. In Brazil, a bank replaced the use of passwords to palm vein authentication in
ATMs. The demand for security pushes the market towards biometrics. A recent market
research estimates that the overall market for voice and face biometrics is expected to reach
nearly US$3 billions by the end of 20181.
A biometric authentication system can be represented with the simple flow chart in Figure
1.1.
Firstly, the biometric trait is captured using some kind of sensor. Secondly, the captured
biometric trait is processed in order to extract biometric features. When it is in an enrollment
procedure, these features will generate a biometric reference, and will be stored in a database.
In an authentication procedure, these features will be compared with the stored biometric
reference. It is possible to observe, in the same Figure, that attacks can be done at any point
1http://www.biometricupdate.com/201307/voice-biometrics-and-how-far-weve-come/?goback=
%2Egde_40210_member_258411747
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Figure 1.1: Simple architecture of a regular biometric authentication system (adapted from
(Xiao; 2005))
of the architecture (Xiao; 2005).
The replay attack is performed by injecting a biometric data, of the target identity, pre-
viously captured in order to gain a non authorized access. The biometric data can be obtained
sniffing the biometric authentication software. To mitigate this kind of attack, the biometric
system should ensure that the provided data was not injected artificially (Xiao; 2005). A com-
mon way to protect against this kind of attack is to associate a timestamp to the data. As it
is improbable to have exactly the same biometric data in different times, this method can be
quite effective.
The biometric reference attack is performed where the biometrics are stored. This kind
of attack, include actions such as the inclusion, removal, modification and theft of biometric ref-
erences. Among this actions, the possibility to steal a biometric reference is the most dangerous
threat, since it is possible to work in a reverse engineering process to regenerate the biometric
trait.
Using a hill climbing technique to optimize to the position and the orientation of the minutia
Martinez-Diaz et al. (2006) and Hill (2001) show that it is possible to generate synthetic finger-
prints compatible with fingerprints stored in a database. Fake fingers (with a real fingerprint)
made of gummy or silicone can be generated with these minutia. It is also possible to inject
these minutia in the Processing module (see Figure 1.1) in order to deceive the authentication
system.
To mitigate the risk of this kind of attack, best practices in security recommend to encrypt
the biometric references and to increase the security policies to access these biometric references.
In the man in the middle attack, the biometric data is intercepted in any point of the
architecture in Figure 1.1. As shown in the Figure 1.1, the attacker can:
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• Manipulate the matching score;
• Manipulate the biometric authentication response;
• Steal biometric data;
• Inject biometric data.
The same security recommendations aforementioned to deal with this security breaks can
be used here; i.e. encrypt the data before transmission, increase the security grants, and so on.
The spoofing attack, in biometric systems, is a direct attack to the biometric sensor; i.e.
a forged biometric trait is presented to the biometric sensor in order to deceive the system.
The goal is to pretend to be someone else in order to get forbidden privileges. Most biometric
systems can be spoofed. Next subsections presents a brief discussion about spoofing in different
biometric traits:
Fingerprint
In fingerprints verification systems, the attacker can forge a fingerprint with different mate-
rials (gummy, silicone, etc). Matsumoto et al. (2002) and Leyden (2002) discuss how to generate
fake fingerprints using materials easily found in supermarkets. Figure 1.2 shows how easy is to
create a mold from a live finger and to reproduce its fingerprint with gummy. This fake finger
can be used to spoof a fingerprint biometric system.
Forging  
the mold 
Gummy on  
the mold 
Fake gummy 
fingerprint 
Mold 
forged 
Figure 1.2: Creating a fake fingerprint (Adapted from (Matsumoto et al.; 2002))
Recently in Brazil (2013), it was reported that doctors in Sa˜o Paulo were arrested after being
caught in the act of using fake fingers made of silicone and imprinted with real fingerprints to
defraud a hospital’s biometric punch-in clock2.
Speaker
For speech biometrics, the attacker can forge a human voice by mimicry or recording the
voice of the target identity and replaying it back to the microphone.
2http://www.foxnews.com/us/2013/03/13/brazilian-doctors-use-fake-silicone-fingers-to-defraud\
-hospital-punch-in-clock/
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Chetty and Wagner (2004), and Eveno and Besacier (2005) address the problem using audio-
visual features. The first one, proposes a bi-modal authentication system using the face infor-
mation in order to increase security. The second one, correlates the lip movements with the
content of the speech as a security barrier.
Zhu et al. (2012) analyse the speech signal itself applying the 1-dimensional LBP (Local
Binary Pattern) followed by a SVM (Support Vector Machines) in order to detect spoofs.
Iris
Iris biometrics has traditionally been regarded as one of the most reliable and accurate
biometric traits, but as the other biometric traits it can also be spoofed. A simple way to spoof
an iris recognition system is using a high quality printed image. More sophisticated attacks
using contact lenses can also be carried out.
Countermeasures to deal with this kind of attacks can be deployed in hardware (with a
specific equipment) or in software (Galbally et al.; 2012). Especially in the software level,
Galbally et al. (2012) address the problem using various types of features, including a set of
high pass filters, motion features and occlusion filters in the iris images followed by a binary
classifier as countermeasure.
An approach based on textures was carried out by Wei et al. (2008). This countermeasure
uses the co-occurrence matrix descriptor followed by a binary classifier.
Face
Recently, the media has reported some situations of attacks in deployed face recognition
systems. Using simple photographs, a research group from University of Hanoi showed how
easy is to spoof the face authentication systems deployed in Lenovo, Asus and Toshiba Laptops
(Duc; 2009). Since the release Ice Cream Sandwich, the Android OS come with a built-in face
authentication system to unlock the mobile phone. Since then, it has been extensively demon-
strated around the web how easy it is to spoof this face recognition system3. As a consequence,
an eye blinking detection has been introduced in the most recent version of the Android OS.
Spoofing in face authentication will be discussed in details in the Chapter 2.
Several technologies related to information security can be deployed in a biometric authen-
tication systems in order to mitigate the mentioned attacks. We can highlight:
• Encrypt the biometric data;
• Improve the security policies;
• Convey the biometric data using a secure channel;
• Deploy all modules of the architecture in a physical arrangement that cannot be pene-
trated;
3http://www.itproportal.com/2011/11/14/ice-cream-sandwich-facial-recognition-cracked/
4
• Using more than one authentication factor.
However, in a spoofing attack, the target is the biometric sensor, and in the architecture pre-
sented in Figure 1.1, it is not possible to apply any of the security strategies to prevent this
kind of attack, becoming the most fragile point. To mitigate this kind of vulnerability, effective
countermeasures against spoofing have to be deployed.
1.1 Scope and Contributions
Focusing in antispoofing countermeasures for face authentication, the goal of this masters
dissertation is two fold. The first one, we introduce a novel method to detect face spoofing using
the spatiotemporal (dynamic texture) extensions of the Local Binary Pattern. The key idea of
the approach is to learn and detect the structure and the dynamics of the facial micro-textures
that characterises real faces but not fake ones. The second one, is to provide a comparative
study of state of the art countermeasures for face antispoofing. The key contribution of this
comparative study is to cover tests in all video face antispoofing databases freely available
focusing in the biases that these databases can introduce in the countermeasures.
1.2 Organization of the Masters Dissertation
Besides this introduction, that presented the motivation of this work, the dissertation has
four more chapters.
The Chapter 2 defines spoofing attacks in face authentication, presenting the main counter-
measures and databases available for this research.
The Chapter 3 defines and presents the results of the proposed countermeasure based on
dynamic texture, the first contribution of this dissertation and their results.
The Chapter 4 defines and presents the results of the comparative study of face antispoofing
countermeasures, the second contribution of this dissertation.
Finally, Chapter 5 presents the conclusions and future work.
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Chapter2
Spoofing Attacks in Face Authentication
As mentioned in the Chapter 1, spoofing attacks in biometrics are direct attacks to the
biometric sensor. This chapter discusses spoofing attacks in face authentication systems and
is organized as follows. Section 2.1 presents the face antispoofing databases publicly available.
Section 2.2 discusses spoofing in face biometrics presenting the state of the art countermeasures.
Finally Section 2.3 presents the final remarks of the chapter.
2.1 Face Spoofing Databases
In this section, we give an overview of three face spoofing databases: the NUAA face anti-
spoofing database (Tan et al.; 2010), the Replay Attack Database (Chingovska et al.; 2012) and
the CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing Database (Zhang et al.; 2012). These databases consist of real
access attempts and several fake face attacks of different natures under varying conditions. To
our knowledge, these databases are currently the only freely available face spoofing databases.
2.1.1 NUAA
The NUAA face spoofing database1 (Tan et al.; 2010) consists of images of real accesses and
attacks made with printed photographs. Emulating a scenario of access in a regular notebook,
this database has images of 15 users splited in 3 section spaced in two weeks. Each section has
4 screenshots per user in different illumination conditions. Figure 2.1 presents two examples of
this database.
2.1.2 Replay Attack Database
The Replay Attack Database2 (Chingovska et al.; 2012) consists of short video (∼10s of
duration) of both real access and attack attempts to 50 different identities using a laptop. It
contains 1200 videos (200 real-access and 1000 attacks) and the attacks were taken in three
different scenarios with two different illumination and support conditions. The scenarios of
attack include:
1http://parnec.nuaa.edu.cn/xtan/data/NuaaImposterdb.html
2http://www.idiap.ch/dataset/replayattack
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Figure 2.1: Printed photo attacks of the NUAA database (courtesy of Tan et al. (2010)).
1. Print: the attacker displays hard copies of high resolution photographs printed on A4
paper;
2. Mobile: the attacker displays photos and videos taken with an iPhone 3GS using the
phone screen;
3. Highdef : the attacker displays high resolution photos and videos using an iPad screen
with resolution 1024×768.
The illumination conditions include:
1. Controlled: the background of the scene is uniform and the light of a fluorescent lamp
illuminates the scene;
2. Adverse: the background of the scene is non uniform and the day-light illuminates the
scene.
The support conditions include:
1. Hand-based: the attacker holds the attack device;
2. Fixed: the attacker sets the attack device in a fixed support so it does not move during
the spoofing attempt.
Figure 2.2 show some examples of real accesses and attacks in different scenarios. In the
top row, samples from controlled scenario. In the bottom row, samples from adverse scenario.
Columns from left to right show examples of real accesses, printed photographs, mobile phones
and tablet attacks. Table 2.1 shows the number of videos of the Replay Attack Database and
its distribution.
The Replay Attack Database provides a protocol for objectively evaluate a given countermea-
sure. Such protocol defines three non-overlapping partitions for training, development (tuning)
and testing countermeasures. The training set is used to train the countermeasure, the devel-
opment set is used to tune the countermeasure and to estimate a threshold value to be used in
the test set. The test set must be used only to report results. As performance measurement,
the protocol advises the use of Half Total Error Rate (HTER)(Equation 2.1).
HTER =
FAR(τ,D) + FRR(τ,D)
2
, (2.1)
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(a) (b) (c) (d) 
Figure 2.2: Some frames of real access and spoofing attempts (a) Real accesses; (b) Printed
attacks; (c) Mobile phone attacks; (d) High definition attacks (courtesy of Chingovska et al.
(2012)).
Type Train Devel. Test Total
Real-access 60 60 80 200
Print-attack 30+30 30+30 40+40 100+100
Mobile-attack 60+60 60+60 80+80 200+200
Highdef-attack 60+60 60+60 80+80 200+200
Total 360 360 480 1200
Table 2.1: Number of videos in each subset. Numbers displayed as sums indicate the amount
of hand-based and fixed support attack available in each subset.
where τ is the decision threshold, D is the dataset, FAR is the False Acceptance Rate and FRR
is the False Rejection Rate. In this protocol, the value of τ is estimated on the Equal Error
Rate (EER) using the development set, which is the error rate when the False Acceptance Rate
(FAR) is equals to False Rejection Rate (FRR).
2.1.3 CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing Database
The CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing Database (CASIA FASD)3 (Zhang et al.; 2012) contains
short videos of both real accesses and attacks attempts of 50 different identities using a laptop.
This database has a variety kind of attacks. This variety is achieved by introducing attacks with
different imaging qualities and fake face attacks. There are three different imaging qualities:
low, normal and high. These different imaging qualities were achieved using video recordings
with different cameras. There are three fake face attacks: warped photo, cut photo and video.
In the warped photo attack, the attacker warps a printed photograph trying to emulate a facial
motion. In the cut photo attack, it was required to the attackers to emulate a blink behavior
3http://www.cbsr.ia.ac.cn/english/FaceAntiSpoofDatabases.asp
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Figure 2.3: Example images of real accesses and the corresponding spoofing attempts (courtesy
of Zhang et al. (2012))
with a printed photo (making holes in the eyes region). In the video attacks, the attacker holds
a device displaying the video.
Examples from the database can be seen in Figure 2.3. Altogether, the database consists of
600 video clips that are divided into subsets for training and testing (240 and 360, respectively).
Results of a baseline countermeasure are also provided along the database for fair comparison.
The baseline countermeasure considers the high frequency information in the facial region using
multiple DoG features and SVM classifier and is inspired by the work of Tan et al. (2010) (see
Section 2.2.3).
Since the main purpose of the database is to investigate the possible effects of different fake
face types and imaging qualities, the test protocol consists of seven scenarios in which particular
train and test samples are to be used. The quality test considers the three imaging qualities
separately, low (1), normal (2) and high quality (3), and evaluates the overall spoofing detection
performance under variety of attacks at the given imaging quality. Similarly, the fake face test
assesses how robust the anti-spoofing measure is to specific fake face attacks, warped photo (4),
cut photo (5) and video attacks (6), regardless of the imaging quality. In the overall test (7),
all data is used to allow a more general evaluation. The results of each scenario are reported as
Detection Error Tradeoff (DET) curves and equal error rates (EER) in the test set.
2.2 The countermeasures
Because of its natural and non-intrusive interaction, identity verification and recognition
using facial information are among the most active and challenging research areas in computer
vision. Despite the significant progress of face recognition technology in the recent decades, wide
range of viewpoints, aging of subjects and complex outdoor lighting are still research challenges.
Advances in the area were extensively reported in Flynn et al. (2008) and Li and Jain (2011).
It was not until very recently that the problem of spoofing attacks against face biometric
system gained attention of the research community. This can be attested by the gradually
increasing number of publicly available databases, as we presented in Section 2.1, and contests
addressing the problem.
Two contests were organized in the last two years. The first one was organized under IJCB
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2011 (International Joint Conference on Biometrics)(Chakka et al.; 2011) which was the first
competition conducted for studying best practices for non-intrusive spoofing detection. More
recently, the second competition in this field, under ICB 2013 (International Conference on
Biometrics)(Chingovska et al.; 2013) was organized.
In authentication systems based on face biometrics, spoofing attacks are usually perpetrated
using photographs, videos or forged masks. While it is possible to use make-up or plastic surgery
as mean of spoofing, photographs and videos are probably the most common sources of spoofing
attacks. Moreover, due to the increasing popularity of social network websites (facebook, flickr,
youtube, instagram and others), a great deal of multimedia content - especially videos and
photographs - is available on the web that can be used to spoof a face authentication system.
Figure 2.4 (a) and (b) shows the biometric data flow in a real access and in a spoofing attack
respectively. In order to mitigate this kind of vulnerability in face authentication systems,
effective countermeasures against face spoofing have to be deployed.
Face	  
authen*ca*on	  
Face	  
authen*ca*on	  
(a) 
(b) 
Scene Biometric 
acquisition 
Scene Acquisition 
for spoofing  
purpose 
Spoofing 
attack 
Fake biometric 
acquisition 
Figure 2.4: Biometric data flow in a face authentication system; (a) Biometric data flow in a
real access; (b) Biometric data flow in a spoofing attack.
The countermeasures against spoofing attempts in face recognition can be macro classified in
countermeasures that depend or do not depend on user collaboration. In countermeasures that
depend on user collaboration, the user is challenged to interact to the face authentication system.
For example, researchers from google are studying a way to unlock the android phones based on
facial expressions4. As can be observed in Figure 2.5, this strategy can be fun in the beginning
but in some situations this can be embarrassing. On the other hand, countermeasures that do
not depend on user collaboration try to solve this issue analysing the signal itself, without any
awareness of the user. This type of countermeasures can be classified by the following cues:
4http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-22790221
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• Presence of vitality (liveness detection);
• Scene characteristics;
• Differences in image quality assessment.
Figure 2.5: New google face unlock screen.
2.2.1 Presence of vitality (liveness detection)
Presence of vitality, or liveness detection, consists of the searching for features that only live
faces can possess. The eye blinking is an activity that humans do constantly. A regular human
blinks once every 2 or 4 seconds in order to maintain the eyes clean and wet. This frequency
can vary in stress conditions and/or in high concentration tasks. In those situations the interval
can extend to ∼ 20 seconds. However, it doesn’t matter in what condition the person is, the eye
blink will always occur. Following this assumption, Pan et al. (2007) propose a countermeasure
measuring the eye blinking using Hidden Markov Models (HMM) mapping the state of eyes
open and closed. Experiments carried out using a database created by the authors and freely
available for download5, shown an accuracy of 95.7% .
Based on the hypothesis that live faces present uncorrelated motion patterns in some parts
of the face and the attacks do not, Kollreider et al. (2009) developed a countermeasure based on
optical flow field to explore such cue. As a reference to the algorithm, were selected the center
of the face an the region of the ears, as can be observed in Figure 2.6.
The strategy of the countermeasure can be summarized as follows:
1. Detect the face region;
2. Delimitate the region of the face center and the ears (Figure 2.6);
3. Determine if the face region is moving more horizontally or more vertically analysing the
optical flow velocities;
5http://www.cs.zju.edu.cn/~gpan/database/db_blink.html
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Figure 2.6: Face regions selection. Input for the algorithm Kollreider et al. (2009) .
4. Compute the ratio between the velocities of the delimited areas of the face center and the
ears;
5. The spoof is detected if the aforementioned ratio was bigger than a threshold α.
The performance was evaluated using an adaptation of the XM2VTS database. The real
accesses were videos from XM2VTS database6 and the attacks were generated with printed
photographs from the same database. With this database, which was not made public, an
EER = 0.5% (Equal Error Rate) was achieved.
2.2.2 Scene
Countermeasures that search scene features analyse the relationship of the face in the scene.
The countermeasure proposed in Anjos and Marcel (2011)7 measures the relative motion
difference between the face and the background. The authors focused on simple differences of
intensities in successive frames. The motion accumulated between this difference (MD), for a
given a Region-of-Interest (RoI) and its respective background, is computed using the following
equation:
MD =
1
SD
∑
(x,y)∈D
|It(D)− It−1(D)|, (2.2)
where D is the RoI, SD is the area of the RoI in pixels, It is the intensity of a pixel and t is the
frame index of frame sequence.
To input the motion coefficient into a classifier, 5 parameters are measured for every window
of 20 frames. The parameters are: the minimum of MD in that time window, the maximum,
the average, the standard deviation and the ratio R between the spectral sum for all non-
DC components and DC component taken as base the N -point Fast Fourier Transform (FFT)
of the signal generate by the MDs accumulated in 20 frames (see Equation 2.3). These 10
parameters (five for the face and five for the background) are fed into a Multi-layer Perceptron
(MLP) classifier, with 5 neurons in the hidden layer, which is trained to detect spoofing attacks.
6http://www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CVSSP/xm2vtsdb/
7http://pypi.python.org/pypi/antispoofing.motion/
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This countermeasure was evaluated using the photograph attacks subset of the Replay Attack
Database(Chingovska et al.; 2012) and achieved an HTER = 9% (Half Total Error Rate).
R =
∑N
i=1 |FFTi|
|FFT0| (2.3)
2.2.3 Differences in image quality assessment
Countermeasures based on differences in image quality assessment rely on the presence of
artifacts intrinsically present at the attack media. Such remarkable properties can be originated
from media quality issues or differences in reflectance properties of the object exposed to the
camera.
Compared to real faces, distinct attack media have different reflexive patterns. Based on
that observation, Chingovska et al. (2012) and Maatta and et al. (2012) explored the LBP
(Local Binary Patterns) texture descriptor analysing single frames. In this countermeasure the
detected faces (see Figure 2.7) are geometric normalized to 64 × 64 pixels. The LBP features
are extracted from the whole face region and histogrammed. The histograms for each frame are
fed into a binary classifier which can be trained to detect spoofing attacks.
Classifier	  
Scene Face detection 
LBP 
codes 
LBP 
histogram 
Spoof/ 
not spoof 
Figure 2.7: Block diagram of the countermeasure based on LBP.
Table 2.2 shows the reported performance, in HTER terms, in the three databases; the
Replay Attack Database, the CASIA FASD and the NUAA Database using the SVM (Support
Vector Machines) and LDA (Linear Discriminant Analysis) as binary classifiers. In the test set,
it can be observed a performance between ∼ 15% and ∼ 20% in the three databases. However,
comparing the performance in the development set (used to tune the hyper-parameters) and in
the test set of the NUAA database suggest a low generalization capability.
Table 2.2: Performance in HTER(%) terms of the LBP countermeasure in three face spofing
databases.
Replay Attack NUAA CASIA-FASD
dev set test set dev set test set dev set test set
LBP u28,1 + LDA 19,60 17,17 0,06 18,32 17,08 21,01
LBP u28,1 + SVM 14,84 15,16 0,11 19,03 16,00 18,17
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Based on the assumption that images/videos used in attacks concentrates information in
some specifics frequency bands, Zhang et al. (2012) propose a countermeasure based on Differ-
ence of Gaussians filters (DoG).
As can be observed in the block diagram in Figure 2.8, four sequences of DoG filters are
applied in the image. Each the gaussian kernel has a size of 3× 3. Their parameters are:
• σ1 = 0, 5 e σ2 = 1;
• σ1 = 1 e σ2 = 1, 5;
• σ1 = 1, 5 e σ2 = 2;
• σ1 = 1 e σ2 = 2.
Classifier	  
Spoof/ 
not spoof 
Detect 
Face 
Different 
DoG filters 
Figure 2.8: Block diagram of the DoG countermeasure
After applying the sequence of filters, the images are geometric normalized to 128 × 128
pixels and fed into a SVM classifier. Evaluated using a the CASIA FASD, the countermeasure
achieved an EER of 17%. With this image dimension, the feature vector of the countermeasure
have dimensionality 65,536. The training step of the SVM with this dimensionality could take
several weeks.
Li et al. (2004), hypothesize that fraudulent photographs have less high frequency com-
ponents than real ones. To test this hypothesis, a small database was built with 4 identities
containing both real access and printed photo attacks. With this private database (which was
not made public), an accuracy of 100% was achieved.
In order to detect noise patterns in spoofing attacks, da Silva Pinto et al. (2012) developed
a countermeasure for videos. First, each frame in a frame sequence is filtered using a gaussian
filter followed by a median filter. These filtered images are subtracted by the original ones.
The result of this subtraction is so called “residual image”. This residual image is analysed in
the frequency domain using a 2D Fourier transform. All processed frames in the videos are
combined using the Visual Rhythm technique Zhang et al. (1995). This technique generates one
image with a combination of all frames ending the preprocessing steps.
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A texture description using Gray Level Co-ocurrency Matrix (GLCM) was applied in the
Visual Rhythm image (Zhong and Chang; 1997). With the co-ocurrence matrix, 12 measures
are extracted to feed into a binary classifier that detects attacks. The classifiers evaluated was
the PLS (Partial Least Squares) and the SVM . With a database combining the photograph
subset of the Replay Attack Database and a database created by the authors (which was not
made public), an AUC (Area Under the Curve) of ∼ 100% was achieved.
2.3 Final Remarks
It was not until very recently that the problem of spoofing attacks against face biometric
systems gained attention of the research community. This can be attested by the gradually
increasing number of publicly available databases (Tan et al.; 2010; Zhang et al.; 2012; Chin-
govska et al.; 2012) and the recently two contests organized (Chakka et al.; 2011; Chingovska
et al.; 2013). With those efforts, a number of countermeasures were recently published and we
presented, in this chapter, the most relevant ones.
Most of the countermeasures presented were evaluated using different metrics and in some
cases using private databases, making the comparison of them a hard task. Just a few of them
have source code available, making this task even harder. Additionally, the countermeasures
recently published focus only in the performance analysis in one database. The extension to
more databases and the analysis of possible biases that these databases can introduce in these
countermeasures are overlooked.
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Chapter3
Developed Countermeasures
This chapter presents a countermeasure developed by the author in the scope of this masters
dissertation. Micro-texture analysis has been effectively used in detecting photo attacks from
single face images (Bai et al.; 2010; Maatta and et al.; 2012; Chingovska et al.; 2012). In this
countermeasure, the micro-texture analysis is extended to the spatiotemporal domain using the
texture descriptor LBP − TOP (Local Binary Patterns from Three Orthogonal Planes). The
basic theory of Local Binary Patterns in spatiotemporal domain is introduced in Section 3.1.
The architecture of the countermeasure is described in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3, we report
on the experimental setup and results. Finally, Section 3.4 presents the Final Remarks of the
chapter.
The content of this chapter was published in a satellite workshop of the Asian Conference
in Computer Vision (ACCV - 2012) with the paper entitled ”LBP-TOP based countermeasure
against facial spoofing attacks” (Pereira et al.; 2012). Additionally this paper was extended
and submitted to the journal ”EURASIP Journal on Image Processing and Video Processing”
organized by Springer with the paper entitled ”Face liveness detection using dynamic texture”
and is still under revision.
3.1 LBP based dynamic texture description
Maatta and et al. (2012) and Chingovska et al. (2012) propose a LBP based countermeasures
to spoofing attacks based on the hypothesis that real faces present different texture patterns in
comparison with fake ones. However, the proposed techniques analyse each frame in isolation,
not considering the behaviour over time. As aforementioned, in Chapter 2, motion is a cue
explored in some works and in combination with texture can generate a powerful countermea-
sure. For describing the face liveness for spoofing detection, we considered a spatiotemporal
representation which combines facial appearance and dynamics. We adopted the LBP based
spatiotemporal representation because of its recent convincing performance in modeling moving
faces and facial expression recognition and also for dynamic texture recognition (Inen et al.;
2011).
The LBP texture analysis operator, introduced by (Ojala et al.; 1996) and (Ojala et al.;
2002), is defined as a gray-scale invariant texture measure, derived from a general definition of
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Figure 3.1: LBP operator. (a) and (b) The basic LBP operator, where the neighbourhood
of each pixel is thresholded and a binary number is obtained. (c) A circular neighbourhood
example (with 8 neighbour points and radius 2). The pixel values are bilinearly interpolated
whenever the sampling point is not in the center of a pixel.
texture in a local neighborhood. It is a powerful texture descriptor and among its properties
in real-world applications are its discriminative power, computational simplicity and tolerance
against monotonic gray-scale changes. Originally, the LBP texture descriptor (Ojala et al.;
1996), was computed in a pixel level basis using a 3×3 kernel, thresholding the surroundings of
each pixel with the central pixel value and considering the result as a binary value. The decimal
form of the LBP code is expressed as:
LBP (xc, yc) =
N−1∑
n=0
f(in − ic)2n, (3.1)
where ic corresponds to the gray intensity of the center pixel (xc, yc), N is the number of sampling
points, in is the gray intensity of the n-th surrounding pixel, and f(x) is defined as follows:
f(x) =
{
0 if x < 0
1 if x ≥ 0 . (3.2)
Ojala et al. (2002) extended this operator to support surrounding points and radius of a pixel
neighbourhood with different shapes and sizes, enabling the handling of textures at different
scales. Fig. 3.1 illustrates the operator calculation and the points distribution in a circular
neighbourhood with radius 2, where the pixel values are bilinearly interpolated whenever the
sampling point is not in the center of a pixel.
Another important extension proposed by Ojala et al. (2002) was the uniform patterns
concept (u2). A LBP operator is considered uniform if it contains at most two bitwise transitions
0-1 or 1-0 when viewed as a circular bits chain. According to Ojala et al. (2002), nearly
90 percent of LBP operators observed in face images are uniform. In spacial terms, uniform
patterns represent some patterns of a texture: spot, flat, area, edge and corner. With an 8-bit
representation, there are 58 patterns with at most two bitwise transitions. Fig. 3.2, extracted
from Chan et al. (2007), describes all possible uniform patterns with 8 neighbours.
Ahonen et al. (2004) and Ahonen et al. (2006) adopted the following notation for the LBP
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Figure 3.2: All uniform patterns for LBP with 8 neighbours Chan et al. (2007).
operator: LBP u2P,R, where the subscript represents the neighbourhood configuration with P
sampling points on a circle of radius R, and the superscript u2 stands for using only uniform
patterns and labelling all non-uniform patterns with a single label.
The original LBP operator was defined to only deal with spatial information. However, more
recently it has been extended to a spatiotemporal representation for dynamic texture analysis
(DT). This has yielded to the so called Volume Local Binary Pattern operator (V LBP (Zhao
and Pietikainen; 2007). The idea behind V LBP consists of looking at video sequence as a set
of volumes in the (X,Y ,T ) space where X and Y denote the spatial coordinates and T denotes
the frame index (time). To capture interframe patterns in textures, V LBP considers the frame
sequence as a parallel sequence. Considering a 3 × 3 kernel and thresholding the surroundings
of each pixel with the central pixel of the frame sequence, the result is considered a binary value
and its decimal representation is:
V LBPL,P,R =
3P+1∑
q=0
f(ic − iq)2q, (3.3)
where L corresponds to the number of predecessors and successors frames, P is the number of
neighbors of ic that corresponds to the gray intensity of the evaluated pixel, iq corresponds to
the gray intensity of a specific neighbor of ic, R is the radius of considered neighborhood and
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f(x) is defined as follows:
f(x) =
{
0 if x < 0
1 if x ≥ 0 . (3.4)
An histogram of this descriptor, contains 23P+1 elements. Considering P = 8 (the most
common configuration Chingovska et al. (2012), Maatta and et al. (2012) Ahonen et al. (2006))
the number of bins in such histogram will be 33, 554, 432 which is not computationally tractable.
To make V LBP computationally treatable and easy to extend, the co-occurrences of the
LBP on the three orthogonal planes (LBP − TOP ) was also introduced Zhao and Pietikainen
(2007). LBP − TOP consists of the three orthogonal planes: XY , XT and Y T , and the
concatenation of local binary pattern co-occurrence statistics in these three directions. The
circular neighbourhoods are generalized to elliptical sampling to fit to the space-time statistics.
The LBP codes are extracted from the XY , XT and Y T planes, which are denoted as XY −
LBP , XT − LBP and Y T − LBP , for all pixels, and statistics of the three different planes
are obtained, and concatenated into a single histogram. The procedure is shown in Figure 3.3.
In this representation, dynamic texture (DT) is encoded by the XY − LBP , XT − LBP and
Y T − LBP .
Figure 3.3: LBP-TOP scheme (a) Three planes intersecting one pixel (b) LBP histogram of
each plane (c) Concatenating the histograms).
Using equal radii for the time and spatial axes is not a good choice for dynamic textures
(Zhao and Pietikainen; 2007) and therefore, in the XT and Y T planes, different radii can be
assigned to sample neighbouring points in space and time. More generally, the radii Rx, Ry
and Rt respectively in axes X, Y and T , and the number of neighbouring points PXY , PXT
and PY T respectively in the XY , XT and Y T planes can also be different. Furthermore, the
type of LBP operator on each plane can vary, for example the uniform pattern (u2) or rotation
invariant uniform pattern (riu2) variants (Inen et al.; 2011) can be deployed. The corresponding
feature is denoted as LBP − TOP operatorPXY ,PXT ,PY T ,Rx,Ry ,Rt .
Assuming we are given a X × Y × T dynamic texture
(xc ∈ {0, · · · , X − 1} , yc ∈ {0, · · · , Y − 1} , tc ∈ {0, · · · , T − 1}), i.e. a video sequence. An
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histogram of the DT can be defined as:
Hi,j =
∑
x,y,t
I {fj(x, y, t) = i} , i = 0, · · · , nj − 1; j = 0, 1, 2 . (3.5)
where nj is the number of different labels produced by the LBP operator in the jth plane
(j = 0 : XY, 1 : XT and 2 : Y T ), fi(x, y, t) expresses the LBP code of central pixel (x, y, t) in
the jth plane and I is defined as follows:
I(A) =
{
1 if A is true
0 if A is false.
(3.6)
Similarly to the original LBP, the histograms are normalized to get a coherent description
for comparing the DTs:
Ni,j =
Hi,j∑nj−1
k=0 Hk,j
. (3.7)
In addition to the computational simplification, compared with V LBP , LBP−TOP has the
advantage to generate independent histograms for each of intersecting planes, in space and time,
which can be treated in combination or individually. Because of the aforementioned complexity
issues on the implementation of a V LBP based processor, the developed spatiotemporal face
liveness description uses LBP − TOP to encode both facial appearance and dynamics.
The key idea of this countermeasure is to learn and detect the structure and the dynamics
of the facial micro-textures that characterize real faces but not fake ones. Due to its tolerance
against monotonic gray-scale changes, LBP based representation is a large used descriptor for
measuring the facial texture quality and determining whether degradations due to recapturing
process, e.g. the used spoofing medium, are observed. Instead of just applying static texture
analysis, we exploit also several dynamic visual cues that are based on either the motion patterns
of a genuine human face or the used display device.
Figure 3.4: Sequence of a warped photo attack extracted from the CASIA FASD Zhang et al.
(2012) describing the characteristic reflections (flickering) of planar spoofing medium and the
distorted motion patterns.
Unlike photographs and display devices, real faces are indeed non-rigid objects with con-
tractions of facial muscles which result in temporally deformed facial features such as eye lids
and lips. Therefore, it can be assumed that the specific facial motion patterns (including eye
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blinking, mouth movements and facial expression changes) should be detected when a live hu-
man being is observed in front of the camera. The movement of the display medium may cause
several distinctive motion patterns that do not describe genuine faces. As shown in Figure 3.4
(between the second and the third picture), the use of (planar) spoofing medium might cause
sudden characteristic reflections when a photograph is warped or because of a glossy surface of
the display medium. As it can be seen, warped photo attacks may cause also distorted facial
motion patterns (see second picture in the Figure 3.4). It is likely that hand-held attacks intro-
duce synchronized shaking of the face and spoofing medium which can be observed as excessive
relative motion in the view and facial region if the distance between the display medium and
the camera is relatively short. Our countermeasure tries to exploit the aforementioned visual
cues for face spoofing detection by exploring the dynamic texture content of the facial region.
We adopted the LBP based spoofing detection in spatiotemporal domain because LBP −TOP
features have been successfully applied in describing dynamic events, e.g. facial expressions
(Zhao and Pietikainen; 2007).
Figure 3.5: Block diagram of the proposed countermeasure based on LBP-TOP.
3.2 Architecture of the countermeasure
Figure 3.5 shows a block diagram of the proposed countermeasure. First, each frame of
the original frame sequence was gray-scaled and passed through a face detector using Modified
Census Transform (MCT ) features (Froba and Ernst; 2004). Only detected faces with more than
50 pixels of width and height were considered. The detected faces were geometric normalized
to 64×64 pixels. The bounding box returned by the automatic face detector, introduce some
noises in the LBP − TOP description. The bounding box, in general, is slightly dislocated in
successive frames, even without a translational movement. The LBP − TOP descriptor can
register movement with this noise. In order to reduce this kind of noise, the same face bounding
box was used for each set of frames in the LBP − TOP calculation. As can be seen in the
Figure 3.6, the middle frame was chosen. Unfortunately, the face detector is not error free and
in case of error in the middle frame face detection, the nearest detection was chosen. If there
is no detected face, in the observed time window, the observation was discarded. After the face
detection step, the LBP operators were applied for each plane (XY , XT and Y T ) and the
histograms were computed and then concatenated. After the feature extraction step, binary
classification can be used to discriminate spoofing attacks from real access attempts.
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Figure 3.6: Face detection strategy for Rt = 1
Face liveness is rather difficult to be determined based on the motion between couple of suc-
cessive frames. The used volume can be expanded along the temporal dimension by increasing
Rt, as aforementioned in section 3.1. This way to deal with dynamic texture is called single
resolution approach, since only one histogram per LBP − TOP plane is accumulated. How-
ever, this leads to rather sparse sampling on the temporal planes XT and Y T , thus we might
loose valuable details. In order to explore the dynamic texture information more carefully, we
proposed the multiresolution approach.
The multiresolution approach can be performed by concatenating the histograms in the time
domain (XT and Y T ) for different values of Rt. The notation chosen to represent these settings
is using brackets for the multiresolution data. For example, Rt = [1− 3] means that the LBP-
TOP operator will be calculated for Rt = 1, Rt = 2 and Rt = 3 and all resultant histograms will
be concatenated. With the multiresolution approach, dense sampling on the temporal planes
XT and Y T is achieved.
3.3 Experiments
This section provides an in-depth analysis on the proposed LBP −TOP based face liveness
description using the Replay Attack Database (Chingovska et al.; 2012) and the CASIA FASD
(Zhang et al.; 2012). The LBP−TOP representation is computed over relatively short temporal
windows and the results are reported using the overall classification accuracy for the individual
volumes. Altogether, four experiments were carried out evaluating the effectiveness of:
1. Each LBP − TOP plane individually and in combination;
2. Different classifiers;
3. Different LBP operators;
4. The multiresolution approach.
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In order to study the effect of the different variables, each parameter was tuned solely (fixing
other elements) using the development set of each face spoofing database. It should be noted
that unlike the Replay Attack Database, the CASIA FASD lacks a specific development set.
Therefore, the first four experiments were performed in this database using cross-validation by
randomly dividing the training data into five folds. Hence, the results presented for CASIA
FASD are actually the average HTER on the test set over five iterations of the algorithm with
different folds playing the role of a development set.
Finally, we also studied the accumulation of facial appearance and dynamics information
over longer time windows and perform an evaluation at system level. The access attempt based
results presented in Section 3.3.5 were obtained using the official protocol of each database.
Inspired by Chingovska et al. (2012), the LBP−TOP operator chosen to start the evaluation
was LBP − TOP u28,8,8,1,1,Rt .
3.3.1 Effectiveness of each LBP−TOP plane individually and in com-
bination
In this experiment, we analysed the effectiveness of each individual plane and their com-
binations when the multiresolution area is increased. Figure 3.7 shows the HTER evolution,
on the test set, considering individual and combined histograms of LBP − TOP planes for
each database. We used, as binary classifier, a linear projection derived from LDA (Linear
Discriminant Analysis) as in Chingovska et al. (2012).
Figure 3.7: HTER(%) evaluation in each plane when the multiresolution area (Rt) is increased
with LBP-TOPu28,8,8,1,1,Rt and LDA classifier - test-set (a) Replay Attack Database (b) CASIA
FASD.
The results indicate differences in the performance between the two databases. The tem-
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poral components (XT and Y T ) are a decisive cue for the Replay Attack Database and the
combination of all three planes (XY , XT and Y T ) gives the best performance. Conversely, for
the CASIA FASD, the addition of temporal planes improves the performance only slightly com-
pared to the spatial LBP representation (considering only the XY plane). These observations
can be explained by taking a closer look at the differences in the databases and their spoofing
attack scenarios. 2D fake face attacks can be categorized into two groups, close-up and scenic
attacks, based on how the fake face is represented with the spoofing medium.
A close-up spoof describes only the facial area which is presented to the sensor. The main
weakness with the tightly cropped fake faces is that the boundaries of the spoofing medium, e.g.
a video screen frame, photograph edges, or the attacker’s hands are usually visible during the
attack, thus can be detected in the scene (Komulainen; 2012). However, these visual cues can
be hidden by incorporating background scene in the face spoof and placing the resulting scenic
fake face very near to the sensor as performed on the Replay Attack Database. In such cases,
the description of facial appearance leads to rather good performance because the proximity
between the spoofing medium and the camera causes the recaptured face image to be out-of-
focus also revealing other facial texture quality issues, like degradation due to the used spoofing
medium. Furthermore, the attacks in Replay Attack Database are performed using two types of
support conditions, fixed and hand-held. Naturally, the LBP − TOP based face representation
can easily detect fixed photo and print attacks since there is no variation in the facial texture
over time. On the other hand, the hand-held attacks introduce synchronized shaking of the face
and spoofing medium. This can be observed as excessive relative motion in the view, again, due
to the proximity between the display medium and the sensor. Since the distinctive global motion
patterns are clearly visible also on the facial region, they can be captured even by computing
the LBP-TOP description over relatively short temporal windows, i.e. low values of Rt.
In contrast, the CASIA FASD consists of close-up face spoofs. The distance between the
camera and the display medium is much farther compared to the attacks on Replay Attack
Database. The display medium does not usually move much in the attack scenarios. Therefore,
the overall translational movement of a fake face is much closer to the motion of a genuine
head. Due to the lack of distinctive shaking of the display medium, the CASIA FASD can be
considered to be more challenging from the dynamic texture point of view. Because the motion
cues are harder to explore in some attack scenarios using small values of Rt, we investigated in
Section 3.3.5 whether the use of longer time windows helps to reveal the disparities between a
genuine face and a fake one.
3.3.2 Effectiveness of different classifiers
In this experiment, we analysed the effectiveness of different classifiers when the multiresolu-
tion area is increased. Fig. 3.8 shows the HTER evolution, on the test set, under three different
classifications schemes. The first one uses χ2 distance, since the feature vectors are histograms.
The same strategy reported by Chingovska et al. (2012) was carried out. A reference histogram
only with real accesses was created averaging the histograms in the training set. The last two
selected classification schemes analysed were: Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) and Support
Vector Machines (SVM) with a radial basis function kernel (RBF).
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Figure 3.8: HTER(%) evaluation with LBP-TOPu28,8,8,1,1,Rt using different classifiers (a) Replay
Attack Database (b) CASIA FASD.
The SVM classifier with an RBF kernel provided the best performance on the Replay Attack
Database and the CASIA FASD (7.97% and 20.72% in terms of HTER, respectively). However,
it is important to remark that the same LBP-TOP configuration with an LDA classifier resulted
in comparable performance (11.35% and 24.91% in terms of HTER). This is not a huge gap
and the classification scheme is far simpler. As similar findings have been reported Chingovska
et al. (2012); Komulainen et al. (2013), the use of simple and computationally efficient classifiers
should be indeed considered when constructing real-world anti-spoofing solutions.
3.3.3 Effectiveness of different LBP operators
The size of the histogram in a multiresolution analysis, in time domain, increases linearly with
Rt. The choice of an appropriate LBP representation in the planes is an important issue since it
impacts the size of the histograms. Using uniform patterns or rotation invariant extensions, in
one or multiple planes, may bring a significant reduction in computational complexity. In this
experiment, the effectiveness of different LBP operators in the three LBP-TOP planes (XY ,
XT and Y T ) was analysed. Fig. 3.9 shows the performance, in HTER terms, configuring each
plane as basic LBP (with 256 bins for P = 8), LBPu2 (uniform patterns) and LBPriu2 (rotation
invariant uniform patterns) when the multiresolution area (Rt) is increased in both databases.
Results must be interpreted with the support of Fig. 3.10, which shows the number of bins on
the histograms used for classifications in each configuration.
When the multiresolution area is increased, the HTER saturates for LBPriu2 and LBPu2 on
both datasets. For the basic LBP operator a minimum can be observed in 7.60% and 20.71%
on the Replay Attack Database and CASIA FASD respectively. On both databases, basic LBP
and LBPu2 presented similar performance. Even though the use of regular LBP leads to the
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Figure 3.9: HTER(%) evaluation with LBP-TOP8,8,8,1,1,Rt using different LBP operators in the
planes with SVM classifier (a) Replay Attack Database (b) CASIA FASD.
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Figure 3.10: Evaluation of the histogram size when (Rt) is increased.
best results, the LBPu2 operator seems to provide a reasonable trade-off between computational
complexity (see Fig. 3.10) and performance. Hence, we will still proceed with LBPu2 in the
three planes.
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3.3.4 Effectiveness of the multiresolution approach
In this experiment we analysed the effectiveness of the multiresolution approach in compar-
ison to the single resolution approach. The single resolution approach consists of using only
fixed values for Rt, without concatenating histograms for each Rt. With this approach the size
of the histograms will be constant for different values of Rt, which decreases the computational
complexity compared to the multiresolution approach. Fig. 3.11 shows the HTER evolution for
different values of Rt in both databases comparing the both approaches.
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Figure 3.11: HTER(%) evaluation using LBP-TOPu28,8,8,1,1,Rt with the single resolution and the
multiresolution approach using SVM classifier (a) Replay Attack Database (b) CASIA FASD.
On both datasets, the HTER of single resolution approach increases with Rt whereas the
multiresolution approach helps to keep the HTER low when the multiresolution area is increased.
This suggests, that the increase of Rt causes more sparse sampling in the single resolution
approach when valuable motion information is lost. In contrary, the more dense sampling of the
multiresolution approach is able to provide a more detailed description of the motion patterns,
thus improving the discriminative power.
3.3.5 Access attempt based analysis
In the previous experiments, the importance of the temporal dimension was studied using
the single resolution and the multiresolution approaches. As presented in Section3.3.1, the mul-
tiresolution approach is able to capture the nature of fixed photo attacks and the excessive
motion of display medium, especially on the Replay Attack Database. However, in some attack
scenarios, the motion patterns were harder to explore using small values of Rt. We now study
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how the temporal window size affects the performance when the facial appearance and dynam-
ics information are accumulated over time. The face description of the single resolution and
multiresolution methods can be accumulated over longer time periods either by averaging the
features within a time window or by classifying each subvolume and then averaging the scores
within the current window. In this manner, we are able to provide dense temporal sampling
over longer temporal windows without excessively increasing the size of the feature histogram.
In order to follow the method used in previous experiments, we begin evaluating the two
averaging strategies with the LBP-TOPu28,8,8,1,1,1 operator and a SVM classifier with RBF kernel.
In order to determine the video based system performance, we applied both average of features
and scores on the first valid time window of N frames from the beginning of each video sequence.
In order to be comparable to the provided metrics in each database, the results on Replay Attack
Database are reported in terms of HTER whereas the performance on CASIA FASD is described
using EER.
The access attempt based performance of both averaging strategies on the two databases
is presented in Fig. 3.12. The results indicate that when the amount of temporal information
increases, the better we are able to discriminate real faces from fake ones. This is the case
especially on the CASIA FASD in which the distinctive motion clues, such as the excessive
shaking of the display medium, cannot be exploited. However, when longer video sequences
are explored, we are more likely to observe other specific dynamic events, such as different
facial motion patterns (including eye blinking, lip movements and facial expression changes) or
sudden characteristic reflections of planar spoofing media which can be used for differentiating
real faces from fake ones. It is also interesting to notice that by averaging features, more
stable and robust spoofing detection performance is achieved on both databases. The averaging
scores of individual sub-volumes seems to suffer from outliers, thus more sophisticated temporal
processing of scores might lead to more stable behavior.
According to the official test protocol of CASIA FASD, also the DET curves and the EERs
for the seven scenarios (Section 2.1.3) should be reported. Based on the previous analysis we
chose to use the average of features within a time window of 75 frames which corresponds to
three seconds of video time. As it can be seen in Fig 3.13 and Table 3.1, the use of only facial
appearance (LBP) leads to better results compared to the baseline method (CASIA FASD
baseline). More importantly, when the temporal planes XT and YT are also considered for
spatiotemporal face description (LBP-TOP), a significant performance enhancement is obtained
(from 16% to 10% in terms of EER), thus confirming the benefits of encoding and exploiting
not only the facial appearance but also the facial dynamics information.
More detailed results for each scenario are presented in Fig. 3.14 and in Table 3.1. The
results indicate that the proposed LBP-TOP based face description yields best results in all
configurations except under cut-photo attacks. As described in Zhang et al. (2012), the DoG
filtering baseline method is able to capture the less variational nature of the cut eye regions
well. However, the difference in the motion patterns seems to be too small for our LBP-TOP
based approach as mainly eye blinking occurs during the cut-photo attacks and no other motion
is present. The EER development presented in Table 3.2 supports this conclusion since the
performance under cut-photo attacks does not improve that much if longer temporal window is
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Figure 3.12: Access attempt based evaluation of different time window sizes using mean of
features and mean of scores with LBP-TOPu28,8,8,1,1,1(a) Replay Attack Database (HTER %) (b)
CASIA FASD (EER %).
Table 3.1: EER (in %) comparison between the DoG baseline method, LBPu28,1 and LBP-
TOPu28,8,8,1,1,1 using average of features on the CASIA FASD.
Scenario Low Normal High Warped Cut Video Overall
DoG baseline Zhang et al. (2012) 13 13 26 16 6 24 17
LBPu28,1 11 17 13 13 16 16 16
LBP-TOPu28,8,8,1,1,1 10 12 13 6 12 10 10
applied compared to the other scenarios.
On the other hand, the spatiotemporal face description is able to improve the major draw-
backs of DoG based countermeasure. Unlike the baseline method, our approach performs almost
equally well at all three imaging qualities. Furthermore, the performance under warped photo
and video attacks is significantly better. Especially the characteristic specular reflections (flick-
ering) and excessive and distorted motion of warped photo attacks can be described very well.
3.3.6 Discussion
Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 summarize all the results obtained for each database following
their provided protocols. In order to be comparable with still frame analysis presented for
example in Chingovska et al. (2012), the results for Replay Attack Database represent the
overall classification accuracy considering each frame individually. The access attempt based
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Figure 3.13: Overall performance of LBP-TOPu28,8,8,1,1,1 using average of features compared to
the DoG baseline method and LBPu28,1 on the CASIA FASD.
Table 3.2: EER (in %) development of LBP-TOPu28,8,8,1,1,1 using average of features on the CASIA
FASD.
Frames Low Normal High Warped Cut Video
1 17 27 23 29 16 20
5 13 20 20 19 14 14
10 14 20 19 18 16 14
25 13 13 10 10 14 12
50 13 11 10 7 13 10
75 10 12 13 6 12 10
results are reported only for CASIA FASD as requested in its test protocol.
Table 3.3 shows also the results for the LBP (Chingovska et al.; 2012) and the Motion Cor-
relation (Anjos and Marcel; 2011) based countermeasures whose source code is freely available.
Table 3.4 contains the provided DoG based baseline and the holistic LBP based face description.
It can be seen that the proposed countermeasure presented the best results overtaking the base-
line results in both databases, thus confirming the benefits of encoding and exploiting not only
the facial appearance, but also the facial dynamics information. Unfortunately, our comparison
is limited to these countermeasures due to the lack of publicly available implementations of
other state-of-the-art techniques presented in literature.
During these experiments we observed that the general performance of the proposed coun-
termeasure was consistently better on Replay Attack Database compared to the CASIA FASD.
As mentioned in Section 3.3.1, the nature of the attack scenarios is different between the two
datasets. In the Replay Attack Database, our LBP-TOP based face description was able to
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Figure 3.14: Performance of LBP-TOPu28,8,8,1,1,1 using average of features compared to the DoG
baseline method and LBPu28,1 under the different protocols of the CASIA FASD.
capture motion patterns of fixed photo attacks and scenic fake face attacks already when only
relatively short time windows were explored. Performances below 10% (HTER) were achieved.
On the other hand, the CASIA FASD turned out to be more challenging from the dynamic
texture point of view. Due to the lack of motion, analysis of longer temporal windows was
required in order to find out distinctive motion patterns between genuine faces and fake ones.
As it can be seen in Table 3.4, by extending the micro-texture based spoofing detection into
spatiotemporal domain, an improvement from 16% to 10% in terms of EER was obtained. The
results also indicate that the proposed dynamic texture based face liveness description was able
to improve the state of the art on both datasets.
3.4 Final Remarks
Inspired by the recent progress in dynamic texture, the problem of face spoofing detection
was investigated in this chapter using spatiotemporal local binary patterns. The key idea of the
proposed countermeasures consists of analysing the structure and the dynamics of the micro-
textures in the facial regions using LBP−TOP features that provides an efficient representation
for face liveness description. The experiments carried out with this countermeasure consistently
31
Table 3.3: HTER(%) of the best results achieved on the Replay Attack Database (following the
database protocol) comparing with the provided baseline.
dev test
Motion Correlation Anjos and Marcel (2011) 11.78 11.79
LBPu28,1 + SVM 14.84 15.16
LBP3×3 + SVM Chingovska et al. (2012) 13.90 13.87
LBP-TOPu28,8,8,1,1,1 + SVM 8.17 8.51
LBP-TOP8,8,8,1,1,[1−2] + SVM 7.88 7.60
Table 3.4: EER(%) of the best results achieved on the CASIA FASD (following the database
protocol) comparing with the provided baseline.
test
DoG baseline Zhang et al. (2012) 17
LBPu28,1 + SVM 16
LBP-TOPu28,8,8,1,1,1 with average of features + SVM 10
outperform prior works on both datasets. Best results were achieved using nonlinear SVM classi-
fier but it is important to notice that experiments with simpler LDA based classification scheme
resulted in comparable performance under various spoofing attack scenarios. Thus, the use of
simple and computationally efficient classifiers should be indeed considered when constructing
real-world anti-spoofing solutions. The results presented in this chapter is reproducible. The
source code with instructions on how to reproduce the results is freely available1.
1https://pypi.python.org/pypi/antispoofing.lbptop/
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Chapter4
Comparative Study of Face Antispoofing
Countermeasures
This chapter presents the experimental results of this comparative study of face spoofing
countermeasures. The countermeasures compared in this dissertation and how each hyper-
parameter was set is discussed in Section 4.1. The Section 4.2 presents the evaluation protocol
applied in this dissertation and section 4.3 presents metrics used. The data evaluated in this
dissertation and how this data was organized in the experiments are covered in Section 4.4. In
Section 4.5 we report our experimental results. Finally, Section 4.6 presents the final remarks
of the chapter.
The content of this chapter was published in the International Conference on Biometrics
(ICB 2013) with the paper entitled “Can Face Antispoofing Countermeasures Work in a Real
World Scenario?” de Freitas Pereira et al. (2013).
4.1 Evaluated countermeasures
Our comparative study considers four countermeasures that do not depend on user collabo-
ration. Representing the state of the art in the face antispoofing research, each countermeasure
explores one of the main cues mentioned in the Section 2.2 (Presence of vitality, Scene charac-
teristics, and Differences in image quality assessment). Next subsections present the details of
each countermeasure and how the hyper-parameters of each one was set.
4.1.1 Motion Correlation
As presented in Section 2.2.2, the Motion Correlation (Anjos and Marcel; 2011) countermea-
sure measures the correlation between the motion of the face and it background. The source
code of this countermeasure is freely available1 in order to allow the reproduction of the results.
There are, basically, two hyper-parameters in this countermeasure. The first one, is the number
of frames used to compute the 5 parameters (see Section 2.2.2). The second one is the binary
classifier.
1https://pypi.python.org/pypi/antispoofing.motion/
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As the authors suggested, twenty frames to compute the 5 parameters are sufficient for the
algorithm to converge in their experiments. The classifier suggested in the paper was one based
on Multi-layer Perceptron. This classifier has, basically, the number of hidden layers and the
number neurons in each hidden layer as hyper-parameters. The authors suggested one hidden
layer and five neurons in this hidden layer as good tradeoff between computational complexity
and performance. We adopted the suggested hyper-parameters in our experiments.
4.1.2 Textures with LBP
Presented in Section 2.2.3, the countermeasure based on Textures with LBP (Chingovska
et al.; 2012) and (Maatta and et al.; 2012) explores the differences in texture properties between
real accesses and attacks in single frames. The source code of this countermeasure is also freely
available2 in order to allow the reproduction of the results.
There are, basically, three hyper-parameters in this countermeasure. The first one is the
geometrically normalized face size. The authors suggested a face size of 64 × 64 pixels. The
second one is the configuration of the LBP texture descriptor. The LBP itself has several
hyper-parameters (Inen et al.; 2011) and the authors of both papers explored only some of
them. In this dissertation, we follow the setup suggested by Chingovska et al. (2012) using
the LBP u28,1. Finally the last hyper-parameter is the binary classifier. The best classifier tested
by Chingovska et al. (2012) was the Support Vector Machines (SVM) using the Radial Basis
Function (RBF).
4.1.3 Dynamic Textures with LBP − TOP
Presented in the Chapter 3 as one of our contributions, the countermeasure based on dynamic
textures with LBP−TOP , explores the texture dynamics to detect attacks in a frame sequence.
The source code of this countermeasure is freely available3 in order to allow the reproduction
of the results.
There are, basically, three hyper-parameters in this countermeasure. The first one is the
geometrically normalized face size. In our previous experiments (see Chapter 3) we worked
with face sizes of 64 × 64 pixels and we will keep this in the next experiments. The second
hyper-parameter is the configuration of the LBP − TOP descriptor. As in the LBP , the
LBP − TOP descriptor itself has several hyper-parameters and most of them were extensively
tuned in Chapter 3. As a good tradeoff between computational complexity and performance,
we selected the following configuration: LBP − TOP u28,8,8,1,1,1 with a single resolution. The last
hyper-parameter is the binary classifier. The evaluation method proposed in the Chapter 3
suggests the SVM classifier with RBF kernel.
4.1.4 Eye blinks
The eye blink countermeasure used in this dissertation, uses a similar technique applied in
Motion Correlation countermeasure (Anjos and Marcel; 2011). The difference is the accumulated
2https://pypi.python.org/pypi/antispoofing.lbp/
3https://pypi.python.org/pypi/antispoofing.lbptop/
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Figure 4.1: Eye blink countermeasure scheme. The eye blink is measured as a motion correlation
between the eyes region and the face region.
motion MD, (see Equation 2.2) is computed between the face region and the eyes region as can
be observed in the Figure 4.1.
The eye blink score for each single frame n in a frame sequence, is computed using the
following equation:
Sn =
MDeye(n)
MDface(n)
− ravg( MDeye
MDface
)(n) (4.1)
where the ravg is the remainder average in a frame sequence until the frame n. Then remainder
average is computed averaging the remainder MD until the frame n.
The trigger of this countermeasure is the number of blinks. In this dissertation, we will test
one, two and three blinks as a trigger of a real access. The source code of this countermeasure
is also freely available4.
4.2 Evaluation Protocol
For this comparative study, we will evaluate the intra-database and the inter-database (or
cross-database) generalization. For that, we developed two test protocols: the intra-test protocol
and the inter-test protocol.
The intra-test protocol evaluates the intra-database generalization. It consists in training,
tuning and testing a countermeasure with the respectively training set, development set and
test set of one database.
The inter-test protocol is a little bit more challenging, since it tests the inter-database
generalization (or cross-database). It consists in training and tuning a countermeasure with
4https://github.com/bioidiap/antispoofing.eyeblink
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the training set and development set of one database and test it with the test set of others
databases.
4.3 Evaluation Metrics
The final performance of each countermeasure using both evaluation protocols in the test
set of each database is reported with the Half Total Error Rate (HTER):
HTER(D2) =
FAR(τ(D1), D2) + FRR(τ(D1), D2)
2
, (4.2)
where τ(D1) is the decision threshold, Dn is the dataset, FAR is the False Acceptance Rate in
the database D2 and FRR is the False Rejection Rate in the database D2. In this protocol, the
value of τ(Dn) is estimated on the Equal Error Rate (EER) using the development set of the
database D1.
In this equation, to measure the performance using the intra-database protocol, is necessary
to consider D1 = D2. To measure the performance using the inter-database protocol, just
consider D1 6= D2.
4.4 Evaluated data
As the Motion correlation, LBP − TOP and the eye blink countermeasures need a frame
sequence to work, the databases appropriate for this dissertation are the Replay Attack Database
(Section 2.1.2) and CASIA FASD (Section 2.1.3).
As already mentioned in Section 2.1.2 the Replay Attack Database has three non-overlapping
partitions; the training, development and test set for respectively train, tune and test a counter-
measure. To run the proposed protocols in this database, we will use the train set to train the
four countermeasures; the development set will be used to estimate the value of τ(D1). Finally
the test set will be used to report the HTER(D2).
The CASIA FASD lacks a specific development set; this database has only a train and a
test set. Since we need the three sets (train, development and test), we split the train set in
five partitions and a 5-fold cross-validation training was done. For that, 4 folds were used for
training and 1 fold was used to estimate the value of τ(D1). The original test set was preserved,
to report the HTER(D2). Because of 5-fold cross validation protocol for the CASIA FASD,
five results were generated. The average of HTER was provided as a final result.
4.5 Experiments
4.5.1 Intra-test protocol
Table 4.1 shows the performance of the four countermeasures, in HTER terms, applying the
Intra-test protocol.
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Table 4.1: HTER(%) of each countermeasure applying the intra-test (D1 = D2) protocol.
Countermeasure
Train/Tune Test HTER(%) FAR(%) FRR(%)
D1 D2 dev test dev test dev test
Correlation
Replay Replay 11.66 11.79 11.66 10.53 11.66 13.05
CASIA CASIA 24.91 31.36 24.91 32.52 24.91 30.21
LBP − TOP u28,8,8,1,1,1 Replay Replay 8.17 8.51 8.17 7.42 8.17 9.60CASIA CASIA 21.77 22.27 21.77 24.24 21.77 20.33
LBP u28,1
Replay Replay 14.41 15.45 14.41 17.32 14.41 13.63
CASIA CASIA 23.00 22.54 23.00 24.78 23.00 20.3
Eye blink (1 blink)
Replay Replay 48.17 52.62 89.67 90.25 6.67 15.00
CASIA CASIA 48.61 48.33 97.22 93.33 0.00 3.33
Eye blink (2 blink)
Replay Replay 53.50 54.87 10.33 16.00 96.67 93.75
CASIA CASIA 41.67 44.81 8.33 6.30 75.00 83.33
Eye blink (3 blink)
Replay Replay 49.17 49.50 0.00 0.25 98.33 98.75
CASIA CASIA 47.22 48.89 2.78 0.00 91.67 97.78
Analyzing the performance in the intra-test protocol (D1 = D2) it can be observed that
different countermeasures have different performances using different databases. As already
discussed in the Section 3.3.1, both databases has some differences that impacts in the final
performance in each database, making the CASIA FASD a more challenging database than the
Replay Attack Database. These differences impacted in our proposed countermeasure, based
on LBP − TOP (Chapter 3), and it seems to impact in other countermeasures as well.
The exception here is the countermeasure based on eye blinks. In both databases de perfor-
mances, in HTER terms, vary from ∼ 40% to ∼ 50% independently of the number of blinks
that we consider, which is worse compared to the other three countermeasures.
By a closer observation into the FAR and FRR in this countermeasure, some conclusions
are possible. Considering one blink as liveness check, it was observed a FAR of ∼ 90% in both
databases. Both databases has video attacks and the countermeasure capture eye blinks from
there. Specially in the Replay Attack Database, the hand-helded attacks introduce noise that
deceive the liveness check. CASIA FASD has warped photo attacks and these warps made by
the attacker also introduce noise that deceives the eye blink system. Also the CASIA FASD has
the cut photo attacks, where the attacker uses masks of the target identity with holes in the
eyes region, as can be observed in the Figure 4.2. This attacks have a real eye blinks.
Increasing the number of eye blinks (two and three) as a liveness check, in order to increase
the robustness, the final performance is still not satisfactory. In HTER terms ∼ 50% in the test
set in both databases. The FAR now is close to 0% but the FRR is greater than 93% in both
databases. The videos in these databases are short (∼ 10s) and it turns out that the people
don’t blink twice in this short recording window. With these evidences of poor performance, we
don’t consider the eye blink countermeasure in this dissertation any further.
However, it is possible to observe that the LBP − TOP , LBP and Motion Correlation
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Figure 4.2: Example of cut the photo attack in the CASIA FASD. It is possible to see the eye
blink in third frame.
countermeasures have a good overall performance and, most important, a good generalization
capability. In Table 4.1, the HTERs in the development and in the test set are very similar
indicating certain generalization capability. The ROC curves (Receiver Operating Characteris-
tic) in Figure 4.5 corroborates the previous assumption. In this figure, the curves blue and red
(dotted line and solid line) represents the intra-test test protocol. It can be observed that the
curves are almost overlapped.
4.5.2 Inter-test protocol
Table 4.2 shows the performance of the three countermeasures, in HTER terms, applying
the Inter-test protocol.
Table 4.2: HTER(%) of each countermeasure applying the inter-test (D1 6= D2) protocol.
Countermeasure
Train/Tune Test HTER(%)
D1 D2 dev test
Correlation
Replay CASIA 11.66 61.78
CASIA Replay 24.91 48.47
LBP − TOP u28,8,8,1,1,1 Replay CASIA 8.17 51.05CASIA Replay 21.77 61.11
LBP u28,1
Replay CASIA 46.87 48.06
CASIA Replay 23.00 57.64
Analyzing the performance in the inter-test protocol (D1 6= D2), it can be observed that the
results considerably degrade compared with the intra-test protocol and it becomes evident that
both databases and the methods are strongly biased, indicating that the countermeasures do
38
(a) (b) 
Figure 4.3: Differences in the capture process between the databases: (a) CASIA FASD attack
(b) Replay Attack Database attack
not generalize as expected. In Table 4.2 the HTERs in the development set and in the test set
are quite different. In Figure 4.5 the ROC curves blue and green (dashed line and solid line)
representing the curves got by the development set of the database D1 and by the test set of
the database D2 when D1 6= D2 respectively, are quite distant from each other.
The results indicate that the differences in the databases can bias the countermeasures. It
was observed two kinds of database bias. The first one is relative to the capture process of the
databases, called capture bias. The second one is relative to the differences of attacks in both
databases called attack bias.
Capture Bias
The attacks in the CASIA FASD are close-up attacks; i.e. the attacker tries to fake only the
face region. It is possible to see the borders of the spoofing medium and even the hands of the
attacker. The attacks in the Replay Attack Database are scenic; i.e. the attacker tries to fake
the face and the background at the same time in order to better fake a real access. There is
no medium borders and no attackers hands in the videos. These differences can be observed in
Figure 4.3
In order to generate a good fake representations of a real access (without any medium borders
and attackers hands), the designers of the Replay Attack Database, in general, approximate to
much the spoofing medium to the camera. It turns out that the size of the faces in the attacks are
generally bigger than in the real accesses. Figure 4.4 shows some examples of that observation.
To see if that observation is significative in the whole database, we can run the intra-test protocol
using, as a feature, only the area of the face bounding box. Table 4.3 shows the performance of
this trick countermeasure.
It can be observed that for the Replay Attack Database the performance in the development
and in the test set is far from a random behavior. This experiment confirm the bias observed
in this database. It is not possible to observe the same shortcoming in the CASIA FASD.
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(a) (b) (c) 
Figure 4.4: Examples of bias in the Replay Attack Database (a) Real access (b),(c) Attempt of
attacks
Table 4.3: HTER(%) of the trick countermeasure using only the area of the face bounding box
applying the intra-test (D1 = D2) protocol.
Tune Test HTER(%)
D1 D2 dev test
Replay Replay 24.22 19.63
CASIA CASIA 51.13 53.09
Attack Bias
The CASIA FASD have different kind of attacks and different way to execute an attack
compared to the Replay Attack Database. Exclusive to the CASIA FASD are the warped photo
and the cut photo attacks that have no similar in the Replay Attack Database. Exclusive to
the Replay Attack Database are the mobile phone attacks. Additionally, the Replay Attack
Database has two different support conditions, the fixed and the hand-held. The CASIA FASD
has only the hand-held support.
In next section, we will focus if the countermeasures are truly biased to databases or can be
tuned to overcome the database bias.
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Figure 4.5: ROC curves of each countermeasure using the intra-test and the inter-test protocol.
(a) Correlation with frame differences countermeasure trained and tuned with the Replay Attack
Database (b) LBP −TOP countermeasure trained and tuned with the Replay Attack Database
(c) LBP countermeasure trained and tuned with the Replay Attack Database (d) Correlation
with frame differences countermeasure trained and tuned with the CASIA FASD (e) LBP−TOP
countermeasure trained and tuned with the CASIA FASD (f) LBP countermeasure trained and
tuned with the CASIA FASD.
4.5.3 Combination of Multiple Databases
In the previous section, we have shown that, with the chosen countermeasures, it was not
possible to get a satisfactory performance in both databases at the same time running the inter-
test protocol. If we can not achieve that in tests with databases, what can we say about applying
these in a real world scenario? If the databases introduce some bias in the countermeasures due
to some particularities of them, we can train each countermeasure with a joint training set
combining both databases in order to overcame these biases. Figure 4.6 shows a schematic of
this joint training. This is the an intuitive approach to create a more robust countermeasure.
spoof	  /	  
not	  spoof	  
REPLAY	  ATTACK	  +	  
CASIA	  FASD	  
Counter	  
measure	  
Figure 4.6: Joint training scheme for countermeasures
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Table 4.4 shows the performance for each countermeasure trained with this strategy.
Table 4.4: HTER(%) of each countermeasure trained with Replay Attack Database and CASIA
FASD and test it with each test set of each database.
Countermeasure Test
HTER(%)
dev test
Correlation
Replay
12.18
24.14
CASIA 43.30
LBPTOP u28,8,8,1,1,1
Replay
14.29
10.67
CASIA 42.04
LBP u28,1
Replay
20.45
19.07
CASIA 45.92
Analyzing the performances of this strategy compared with the performance obtained with
the inter-set protocol, it can be observed a significant improvement for all three countermeasures.
However, comparing with the intra-test protocol, the performance drops drastically. It can be
observed that the performance for CASIA FASD degrades more than for the Replay Attack
Database suggesting a strong bias for this database.
The results suggest that this strategy is ineffective using these countermeasures. Addition-
ally, this strategy has one possible drawback. In face of new kinds of attacks or new databases it
is necessary to train and tune all the countermeasures again. And this could be time consuming.
4.5.4 Score Level Fusion based Framework
In order to improve the performance results in comparison with the intra-test protocol and
the inter-test protocol, and to mitigate the bias mentioned in Section 4.2, we introduce a frame-
work based on score level fusion.
This framework consists of training each countermeasure to one specific database; each one
will generate a score and these scores are fused generating the framework output. The fusion
strategy used in this dissertation was a simple sum of normalized scores. Figure 4.7 shows a
schema of the Score Level Fusion based Framework. In this Figure, the same countermeasure
are trained with two different databases and each one generates a score. These scores are fused
generating the final score of the Framework.
Using this strategy, when a new countermeasure need to be added, it is possible to “plug
it” in the framework. This strategy is similar to an antivirus software. An antivirus is robust
against different kind of attacks and they have regular updates in order to become more robust
against new threats.
As a support metric for the framework, we first evaluate the level of independence of the
countermeasures trained with different databases in order to ensure its effectiveness in a possible
score fusion. Kuncheva and Whitaker (2003) show that the combination of statistically inde-
pendent classifiers is recommended for a good performance in a score level fusion. In order to
evaluate the dependence of classifiers, they analyzed ten statistics. The methodology presented
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Figure 4.7: Score Level Fusion based Framework schema
in that work shows that the Q−statistic is most suitable and we choose that metric to evaluate
the statistic dependence of each countermeasure for the Score Level Fusion based Framework.
The Q− statistic for two classifiers is defined as follow:
QR,C =
N11N00 −N01N10
N11N00 +N01N10
(4.3)
where R is the countermeasure trained with the Replay Attack Database; C is the countermea-
sure trained with CASIA FASD; N11 is the number of times that the countermeasure trained
with the Replay Attack Database hits (i.e. correctly classifies a sample) and the countermeasure
trained with the CASIA FASD also hits; N10 is the number of times that the countermeasure
trained with the Replay Attack Database hits and the countermeasure trained with the CASIA
FASD misses; N01 is the number of times that the countermeasure trained with the Replay
Attack Database misses and the countermeasure trained with the CASIA FASD hits and N00 is
the number of times that the countermeasure trained with the Replay Attack Database misses
and the countermeasure trained with the CASIA FASD also misses. The range of this measure
goes from -1 to 1.
For statistically independent countermeasures it is expected a QR,C close to 0. Results close
to 1 means that both countermeasures are very similar and there is no improvement in the
fusion. Results close -1 indicates that both countermeasures oppose each other and a high
degradation in the fusion should be expected.
Table 4.5 shows the statistic dependency using the Q − statistic and the performance in
each database trained with the Score Level Fusion based Framework. The analysis is supported
with the ROC curves presented in Figure 4.8.
Analyzing the Q− statistic it is possible to observe that the Correlation with Frame Differ-
ences countermeasure is the most statistically independent and suggests that a score fusion is
suitable. This can be attested analysing its performance compared with the inter-test (see Table
4.2) and intra-test (see Table 4.1) protocol results. For the inter-test protocol the improvement
with the Score Level Fusion based Framework was significative. Comparing with the intra-test
protocol the degradation was very low and the countermeasure is able to detect spoofs in both
databases with different degrees of success.
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Table 4.5: Q − statistic and HTER(%) of each countermeasure trained with the Score Level
Fusion based Framework and test it with each database.
Countermeasure Test QR,C
HTER(%)
dev test
Correlation
Replay 0.11
13.71
12.39
CASIA -0.14 32.08
LBPTOP u28,8,8,1,1,1
Replay 0.24
23.16
26.04
CASIA -0.41 38.18
LBP u28,1
Replay 0.38
19.69
21.66
CASIA -0.41 47.16
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Figure 4.8: ROC curves of each countermeasure trained with the Score Level Fusion based
Framework (a) Correlation with frame differences (b) LBP − TOP countermeasure (c) LBP
countermeasure.
However the Q− statistic for the LBP − TOP and the LBP countermeasures present un-
balanced values for each database. Specially for the CASIA FASD QR,C ' −0.4 suggesting that
each one of this two countermeasure trained with different databases oppose each other and are
not suitable for the Score Level Fusion based Framework. This can be attested analysing their
performances compared with the intra-test protocol results (see Table 4.1). The degradation is
still high.
It is important to remark that the literature lacks in video face spoofing databases and
is not possible to ensure the effectiveness of the Score Level Fusion based Framework in a
third database. Its effectiveness in a third video face spoofing database, at this stage is only
speculative. Another point to highlight is that the fusion strategy chosen for this work is quite
simple. For a future extensions more complex fusion strategies need to be addressed.
4.6 Final Remarks
This chapter compared four countermeasures, representing the state of the art of the research
field, using two different test protocols. Using the only two video face antispoofing databases
publicly currently available (Replay Attack Database and CASIA FASD) we introduced the
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intra-test protocol and the inter-test protocol.
The evaluation of each countermeasure using the intra-test protocol suggests a good perfor-
mance and good intra-database generalization power for three countermeasures (Textures with
LBP , Dynamic textures with LBP − TOP and Motion Correlation). The exception was the
countermeasure based on eye blinks. Due to some particularities of the databases, this counter-
measure was not effective in this protocol and it was discarded. Using the inter-test protocol,
the countermeasures accumulates a lot of degradation suggesting a strong bias in the databases.
It was highlighted to kinds of database bias, the capture bias and the attack bias.
To overcame these biases, we introduced two approaches. The first one, combination of
multiple databases, combines the train set of each database to train each one of the presented
countermeasures. Compared with the inter-test protocol, this strategy improved the counter-
measures performance. However, it was observed a strong bias on the Replay Attack Database
degrading the performance in the CASIA FASD compared with the intra-test protocol. In the
second approach, we introduced the Score Level Fusion based Framework that merges the scores
of countermeasures trained with different databases. Only countermeasures that are statistically
independent are suitable for an effective score fusion. Analyzing the Q− statistic measure, the
Correlation with Frame Differences countermeasure is the most statistically independent and
it is the most suitable for the Framework. This was attested comparing the performance of
this countermeasure with the performance obtained with the inter-test and intra-test protocols.
However, the framework performance using the LBP − TOP and LBP presented unbalanced
values for each database and high absolute values for the Q− statistic. This behavior indicated
the “improperness” of fusion for these countermeasures. The results presented in this chapter
is reproducible. The source code with instructions on how to reproduce the results is freely
available5.
The Score Level Fusion based Framework can be extended to assume different configurations.
For example, it is possible to train different countermeasures with a specific kind of attack.
Assuming this configuration, each element of the framework will be specialized to solve one
problem (video attacks, mask attacks, printed paper, and so on). Additionally, it is possible to
configure the framework to work with different algorithms. For example, it is possible to fuse the
scores of the Motion Correlation with the scores of LBP − TOP . It is possible even to provide
the score of a face verification as an input for the framework. These different configurations are
left to be treated in a future work.
5https://pypi.python.org/pypi/antispoofing.crossdatabase/
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Chapter5
Conclusions
The goal of this masters dissertation was two fold. Firstly, we introduced a novel method
to detect face spoofing using dynamic textures. The key idea of the method was to analyse the
structure and the dynamics of micro-textures in the facial regions using the LBP−TOP texture
descriptor. The LBP − TOP provides an efficient representation for the countermeasure. The
experiments carried out with this countermeasure consistently outperform prior works on the
Replay Attack Database and in the CASIA FASD (following their provided protocols). Best
results were achieved using nonlinear SVM classifier, but it is important to notice that experi-
ments with simpler LDA based classification scheme resulted in comparable performance under
various spoofing attack scenarios. The use of simple and computationally efficient classifiers
should be considered when constructing real-world anti-spoofing solutions.
Secondly, we compared four countermeasures, representative of the state of the art of this
field, using two different test protocols. Using the two video face antispoofing databases pub-
licly available (Replay Attack Database and CASIA FASD) we introduced the intra-test protocol
and the inter-test protocol. The intra-test protocol enabled us to measure the performance and
evaluate the intra-database generalization of countermeasures. The evaluation of each counter-
measure using this protocol suggests that they are effective to detect spoofs in both databases.
Even presenting different performances for different databases, the evaluated countermeasures
presented a generalization capability. The only exception was the countermeasures based on
eye blinks. With one eye blink, as a liveness check, this countermeasure was easy to deceive,
with a FAR higher than 90%. Increasing the number of eye blinks the FRR was higher than
90%. The inter-test protocol enabled us to evaluate the inter-database generalization of the
countermeasures. Using this protocol, it was observed that the evaluated countermeasures are
sensitive to the databases biases. It was not possible to detect attacks from one database train-
ing the countermeasures with another database. It was observed two kinds of database bias.
The first one, called capture bias, is a bias related to process of the databases construction.
Both databases present different ways to carry out the attacks. The second one, called attack
bias, is a bias related to the attacks. There are some attacks exclusive to the CASIA FASD
and there are some exclusive to the Replay Attack Database.
In order to overcame these biases we introduce two approaches. The first one, combination
of multiple databases, combines the train set of each database to train each one of the presented
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countermeasures. This strategy brought improvements, in HTER terms, compared with the
inter-test protocol, but it was observed a strong bias to the Replay Attack Database. In the
second approach, we introduced the Score Level Fusion based Framework that merges the scores
of countermeasures trained with different databases. The results obtained with the Score Level
Fusion based Framework suggest that combining two good and not correlated countermeasures
leads to significant improvement in performance, in HTER terms, compared with both protocols.
However, the literature lacks in video face spoofing databases; there are only two freely available.
The effectiveness of the Score Level Fusion based Framework in a third video face spoofing
database, at this stage is only speculative
5.1 Contributions
This masters dissertation provided the following contributions:
1. An effective countermeasure against face spoofing attempts based on dynamic texture;
2. A comparative study on the state of the art countermeasures considering different databases
and analysing possible biases that these databases can introduce in the countermeasures;
3. A reproducible research. All source codes of this masters dissertation are freely available
for download for future studies;
5.2 Future work
As future work, we can suggest:
1. Explore different LBP operators in the LBP − TOP planes;
2. Construction of new face antispoofing database in order to measure the effectiveness of
the Score Level Fusion based Framework;
3. Evaluate different fusion strategies in the Score Level Fusion based Framework;
4. Evaluate different organizations for the Score Level Fusion based Framework. For exam-
ple, it is possible to cover “micro” countermeasures, each one specialized in one type of
attack. It is possible also to aggregate into the framework countermeasures that are com-
plementary as in (Komulainen et al.; 2013) or even consider the scores of a face verification
as an element of the framework as in (Chingovska, Anjos and Marcel; 2013).
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